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TORTS
William E. Crawford*
CHARITABLE IMMUNITY ABOLISHED
In Garlington v. Kingsley,' the Louisiana supreme court abol-
ished the doctrine of charitable immunity without condition or excep-
tion. The court held that "charitable institutions are not immune
from suit in tort and that injured parties proceeding against such
institutions need not plead or establish those circumstances which
some courts have recognized in the past as exceptions to the so-called
rule of charitable immunity."' It is unnecessary to detail the history
of the doctrine of charitable immunity in this state or to analyze the
jurisprudence applying the doctrine, since that has been done
thoroughly in an excellent article by Gary L. Boland in the Louisiana
Bar Journal.'
EXECUTIVE OFFICER LIABILITY
In Canter v. Koehring Co.,' the Louisiana supreme court
summed up the law of so-called executive officer liability. The court
stated that a person is liable as an executive officer if he is an "officer,
agent, or employee of an employer or principal" and is liable to a
third party, even a co-employee, for injuries caused as a result of the
"breach of a duty imposed by the employer or principal upon the
executive officer.
' 5
In Canter, decedent was killed while working for a contractor
who was erecting a chemical plant for a company which had agreed
to provide all labor and equipment necessary to build the plant,
including engineering services and the specifications and instructions
required to execute the work properly. The death occurred when a
crane with a load limit of fifty tons broke while lifting a load of fifty-
three tons. The court found that the company had undertaken the
duty to furnish the contractor with information as to the weight loads
to be lifted by the crane. Further, the company had delegated that
responsibility to five of its engineers, who were consequently held
liable to decedent's survivors for their negligence.
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Two of the four criteria listed by the court for imposing individ-
ual liability' upon executive officers are relevant in analyzing what
duty is breached when such officers are found liable under Civil Code
article 2315:
1. The principal or employer owes a duty of care to the third
person (which in this sense includes a co-employee), breach of
which has caused the damage for which recovery is sought.
2. This duty is delegated by the principal or employer to the
defendant.7
The exposure to financial loss thus thrust upon employees of
corporations and other business entities smacks of unfairness. Al-
though, by virtue of the negligence of its employee, the company may
negligently cause injury to another of its employees, the pocketbook
of the company is protected by the workmen's compensation statu-
tory limitation on damages. The negligent employee, on the other
hand, is liable for breach of the same duty borne by the entity, but
he has a much slimmer pocketbook and no limitation of liability,
unless he happens to be fortunate enough to live in those higher
echelons covered by company liability policies.'
Another disturbing implication of this theory of liability is that
the injured workman may now recover fully in tort under circumstan-
ces intended to be covered by workmen's compensation, thus under-
mining the policy purposes for the limited liability imposed by those
statutes. To prevent the full brunt of the risk from being placed on
those least able to bear it, Louisiana should join the growing list of
states which have enacted statutory immunities among co-
employees.'
6. The opinion correctly points out that employee liability under the theory in
Canter differs from that which the employee may suffer as the result of violation of
some duty resting upon him alone. Id. at 722 n.7.
7. Id. at 721.
8. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-
Insurance, 35 LA. L. REV. 415, 419 (1975).
9. See Comment, 33 LA. L. REV. 325, 332 (1973). For a list of states which have
adopted statutory immunity see id. at 333 n.44.
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